
Talking Points for the ADDI Appearance Before HPSCI	25 <b>X</b> 1
	25/1
Appearance before an ooi	Trania
Developments in the Iran-Iraq War  23 September 1986	Thania. ) ffe usive
Iranian preparations suggest that an Iranian offensive could be launched at any tin Both Iran and Iraq have also stepped up attacks on ships in the Persian Gulf, and Iraq is becoming more aggressive in its airstrikes against Iranian economic facilities.	ne. any
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Minister met with Ayatollah Khomeini last week press for an offensive. According to a generally reliable source, Khomeini direct that two operations begin as soon as possible.	ted Khomen
<ul> <li>Iran has mobilized a large number of volunteers and is continuing to mass troo equipment along several areas of the border.</li> </ul>	ps and
Iranian Army commanders have been holding final planning meetings at the sou and central fronts.	Hors
Iranian forces during the past two weeks have been conducting small attacks and maneuvering into better positions from which to launch larger attacks.	last 2
<ul> <li>Revolutionary Guard units on 12 September staged an unsuccessful attack again lraquipositions in the Majnoon Island area.</li> </ul>	« Majuoo
Iranian Army troops launched a series of successful small assaults on Iraqi pos north of Mehran last week. The Army appears to be making preparations for m fighting in the area.	itions ore wo. o
Operations carried out by the Army along the central front—probably between Qa Shirin and Mehran—may serve as diversions for larger attacks led by the Revolutionary in the south.	sr-e
<ul> <li>Usually the Army does not conduct major offensives on its own but assists the Revolutionary Guard.</li> </ul>	feint
<ul> <li>The Army's apparent success at Mehran, however, may encourage the Iranians press the attack along that front.</li> </ul>	to
Attacks along the central front, even if they are diversions for operations in the so probably will be aimed at gaining another foothold in Iraqi territory. The Iranians may, example, try to seize Mandali, less than 100 miles from Baghdad, believing success in seffort would cause serious difficulties for Iraqi President Saddam Husayn.  Baghdad's recent success in using its air force to strike Iranian economic facilities probably will strengthen Tehran's determination to launch an offensive before its economic facilities.	outh, for Sel2-1 uch an Manda
Baghdad's recent success in using its air force to strike Iranian economic facilities probably will strengthen Tehran's determination to launch an offensive before its econo problems worsen further.	mic .
Iraq attacked K <u>hark Island on 16 September.</u> This attack, combined with damage inflicted last month, <u>makes the T-jetty</u> the principal outlet for Iranian	Khark
TOP SECRET	25X11

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## Oil Facilities Damage Assessment

## Iran-Iraq: New Damage at Khark Island

(Based on information available as of 12:00 EDT 17 September 1986)

Iraqi aircraft conducted strikes on key	<u> </u>
	2
maint damage to the I feet capers	
grand turther reductions and the intermediate	nq
capacity at Khark to no more than 2 million barrels per day	Y
was attackedprobably by an Iranian vessel according to the	ne US
Consulate in Dhahran.	
Iranian exports last month were reduced to 1.3 million from a high of 1.8 million b/d early in the year, due to I attacks at Khark, attacks at Tehran's transshippment facil Sirri Island, movement of this facility to Larak Island an weather. All but 200,000 b/dlifted at Lavan Island—of texports have been shuttled from Khark.  Precise hits yesterday completely severed the northern section of the T-jetty from the main section, leaving a gamearly 20 meters of open water and twisted pipe between be and 1. Unlike previous attacks, this one caused major strudamage. Coupled with earlier damage—the southern section T-jetty was put out of commission by Iraqi attacks in earl August—we believe the new damage will prevent the T-jetty being used for an indefinite period.  Prior to yesterday's strikes, recurring attacks at Kharaman and the damage will attacks at Kharaman and the damage will prevent the T-jetty being used for an indefinite period.	b/d raqi ity at d bad hese  p of rths 7 actural of the y from
	~/ ~
from a pre-war level of about 9 million b/d. Crude oil life Khark is now restricted to the undamaged berths of the Sea	Island
on the western side of Khark, capable of loading about 2 r	nillion
b/d.	
	•
Khark 9 m. b/d pre-wan	
1 1 0 1/ 1/11	
· m b/d Copy	of 19
	s of 19
Single Point 2 m. bld at Ganaveh	≤ of 19
Single point 2 m. bld at Ganaveh	s of 19
Single point 2 m. bld at Canaveh Mornings. 2 m. bld at Canaveh	≤ of 19
Single point 2 m. 5/d at Canaveh Mornings. 2 m. 5/d at Canaveh Lavan Island 200,000 6/d	≤ of 19

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es e La companya di mangana	,	
been completed and these maker loadings are confirmed this facility is estimated with Khark's export capability at the confirmed that the confirme	on of the single point moorings cerminals—off the coast of Ganaveh has any now be operational, although no med. If operational, the capacity of at about 2 million h/d and, coupled lity, would permit Iranian exports at a b/d. We estimate exports will be ter which loadings will resume at the the SPMs.	2
Market Reaction		
Because the delays to I short lived, we expect the	Iranian exports are expected to be market reaction will be limited.	2
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